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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates: "Squeeze-Outs" in
Small Enterprises. By F. Hodge O'Neal' and Jordan Derwin.2 Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961, pp. xii, 263. $10.00.
Any study bearing the by-line, F. Hodge O'Neal, on the special
problems of the close corporation, is presumptively worthy of attention. No
one has written as extensively and intensively on this subject as has he. In
1958, his earlier contributions were collated and amplified in his two-volume
work, Close Corporations: Law and Practice, 3 the only published treatise on
the subject.
The focus of this study, sponsored by a grant from the Federal Small
Business Administration Management Research Grant Program, is on
"squeeze-outs"4 in close corporations, although some consideration is given
to squeeze-outs in partnerships. The approach is both pragmatic—based on
several hundred reported cases and the experiences of many small business-
men, their lawyers and other business advisers—and academic—posing
possibilities of potential squeeze-out techniques and their prevention in the
light of existing statutory and decisional law. In an appendix are detailed
four case histories.5
Various squeeze-out settings are comprehensively but not exhaustively
discussed with a view to determining the underlying causes of squeeze-outs.
The major discussion is on the various squeeze-out techniques, e.g.,
withholding dividends; elimination of minority shareholders from the board
of directors and from employment; high executive compensation to majority
shareholders; extraordinary corporate matters; bankruptcy; issuance of
additional shares; and contractual arrangements. Many of these techniques
are well known to students of business enterprise law; some of the possibili-
ties are ingeniously devious, such as incorporating a partnership to attain
the far greater, varied, and more sophisticated squeeze-out potential avail-
1 Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
2 Associate, Brennan, London & Buttenwieser, New York City.
3 See Book Reviews, 45 A.B.A.J. 1189 (1959) ; 1 B.C. Ind. & Coma L. Rev. 335
(1960); 33 Conn. B.J. 321 (1959); 21 Ga. B.J. 225 (1958); 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1187
(1959); 9 J. Pub. L. 245 (1960); 19 La. L. Rev. 233 (1958); 31 Miss. L.J. 195 (1960);
34 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 799 (1959); 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 448 (1959); 26 U.Chi. L. Rev. 347
(1959); 12 Vand. L. Rev. 306 (1958); 5 Wayne L. Rev. 278 (1959). On the basis of his
treatment of close corporations in the legal periodicals alone, Professor George D.
Hornstein of New York University School of Law is Professor O'Neal's peer.
4 "Squeeze-out" is used as a synonym for "freeze-out," meaning "the use by some
of the owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic position, inside infor-
mation, or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique, to
eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants" (p. 3)—the
aggressors being called "squeezers" and the victims being called "squeezees." Professor
O'Neal in his 1958 work uses the term, "freeze-out."
' Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1958),
aff'd, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959), rehearing denied, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959) ; Brown v. Dolese, 154 A.2d 233 (Del. Ch. 1959),
aff'd sub nom., Dolese Bros. Co. v. Brown, 157 A.2d 784 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1960); Gaines v.
Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 331, 67 S.E.2d 355 (1951), 234 N.C. 340, 67 S.E.2d 350 (1951);
Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
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able in the corporate form, or, if the local law does not provide a favorable
squeeze-out climate for a corporation, merging or consolidating into a
corporation incorporated in a more accommodating jurisdiction. Manipula-
tion of share transfer restrictions and the squeeze-out possibilities in tax-
option corporations under Subchapter S are also among the subjects covered.
But the approach is not entirely Machiavellian. Arrangements to avoid
squeeze-out under present law are outlined in a functional manner, although
warranted caution as to the judicial enforceability of some of them in
various jurisdictions is expressed. Such counters to squeeze-outs include
advance buy-out arrangements; arrangements for settling disputes; share-
holder agreements; long-term employment contracts; and intracorporate
provisions requiring greater-than-normal votes for shareholder and board of
directors action. Sensible use of these arrangements, unfortunately, is best
left to legal specialists, who rarely are retained when they should be, namely,
when the business enterprise is formed.
Most constructive are the authors' "Idea Guides for Changes in Legal
Controls" in the final chapter. Among those suggested are greater judicial
discrimination in applying the ostrich-like-approach "business judgment"
rule; mandatory dividend statutes; the so-called "fairness" test for extra-
ordinary corporate matters—with the burden of proof on the proponents of
the change; broadening of the appraisal remedy to apply to any corporate
action which substantially impairs the minority shareholder's position;
more imaginative equitable relief; and greater judicial tolerance toward the
special problems of the close corporation, especially their intracorporate
provisions. The British experiences of using the Board of Trade as a
"watchdog" over companies and under Section 210 of the English Companies
Act of 1948 are summarized and found to be less than satisfactory solutions.
Susceptible squeezers and squeezees, and their advisors, need this
reference work, much as a physician needs a manual on poisons and their
antidotes. One might well surmise that the publication of this study will
discourage carrying on a small business in the corporate or partnership form
and increase the number of individual proprietorships. The legal practi-
tioner, especially of older vintage, can review in this study the tremendous
recent growth of the law in this area; the law student will find concise, well-
written abstracts of the leading cases, although the $10.00 price of the
263-page book—unfortunate for a study sponsored by the federal govern-
ment and published by a university press—militates against student pur-
chase.
Greater stress in the two concluding chapters, in the opinion of this
reviewer, might have been placed on the need for statutory revision, and
less on intracorporate arrangements and judicial enlightenment—important
as both are. To the list of "idea guides" (limited, of course, to close corpora-
tions), this reviewer would add three that he feels are more significant than
those emphasized: (1) liberalization of "statutory norms;" 6 (2) possibility
6 By "statutory norms" is meant the courts' construction of explicit statutory lan-
guage and the public policy they glean therefrom—generally to the effect that share-
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of eliminating the board of directors;? and (3) subjecting associates to
fiduciary duties among themselves. 8 These, coupled with the study's sug-
gestion for broadening the appraisal remedy 9—a remedy far more meaning-
ful in a close corporation than in a corporation whose shares have a stock
exchange or over-the-counter market—while no panacea, would deter
squeeze-outs by eliminating various technicalities" and generally promoting
higher business ethics and sounder equitable relief."
Professor O'Neal and Mr. Derwin are to be complimented on this most
worthwhile, pioneering study, the first comprehensive one on the subject. It
presages well for the future studies in the series of investigations Duke Uni-
versity is making of the legal problems of small business under the sponsor-
ship of the Federal Small Business Administration.
HARRY G. HENN
Professor of Law
The Cornell Law School
Author, Henn on Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises
(1961).
holders, usually by majority vote of the shares, elect the board of directors which,
usually by majority vote per capita, manage the business. This idea is discussed but
should have been given more emphasis (see § 8.10). See, e.g., Henn on Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises § 259 (1961). See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-24(a), 55-
125 (a) (3) (1960), discussed in O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations,
23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 341 (1958) ; Lally, The Close Corporation and the North
Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 432 (1956); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
(effective April 1, 1963), discussed in Stevens, New York Business Corporation Law of
1961, 47 Cornell L.Q. 141 (1962).
7 Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate
Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696 (1960). But is, as stated in Kaplan v. Block, 183
Va. 327, 335, 31 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1944), a business corporation without a board of di-
rectors "an impossible concept"? See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141 (Supp. 1961) ; N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law §§ 620(b), 701, 707.
8 If the shareholders functioned as mutual agents, the fiduciary relationship would
inhere as a logical consequence. Cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(e) (shareholders' duties
same as that imposed on directors—presumably to corporation—§ 717—see note 10
infra). Cf. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
9 Obviously, the appraisal remedy tends to assure that the squeezee receives the
fair value of his shares, but presumably the squeezee does not want to be squeezed out.
If he elects appraisal, he elects to be squeezed out in most jurisdictions. Furthermore,
the very existence of the appraisal remedy might make it his exclusive remedy or result
in the denial of equitable relief on the ground that the legal appraisal remedy is ade-
quate. For comparisons of American appraisal statutes, see 2 Model Business Cor-
poration Act Annotated § 74 (1960).
to E.g. , elimination or at least limitation of "business judgment" ride; imposition
of burden of proof on fiduciary where self-interest involved; greater enforceability of
intracorporate arrangements; enforcement by individual action (subject to possibility
of court's barring actions between "partners"), rather than by derivative action subject
to various restrictions on latter.
11 When all is said and done, the chief anti-squeeze deterrent is uncompromising
judicial insistence upon the fiduciary relationship of those in control whether directors,
officers, or shareholders, not only to the corporation but also to other shareholders.
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